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Abstract 
Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation 
that results in the same collusive price has no effect on the critical discount factor required to 
sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly when collusion is 
sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot 
duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount 
factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same collusive 
price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) it is shown that the revenue is 
always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. 
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1. Introduction 
An ad valorem tax and specific tax that result in the same consumer price will yield the 
same tax revenue under perfect competition, but an ad valorem tax will yield higher tax revenue 
than a specific tax under monopoly.1 An early analysis of taxes under Cournot oligopoly with 
homogeneous products is provided by Dierickx, Matutes, and Neven (1988), but the systematic 
comparison of ad valorem and specific taxes under oligopoly began with the article by 
Delipalla and Keen (1992). In a conjectural variation oligopoly model they demonstrate that 
an ad valorem tax is superior to a specific tax by considering a tax reform that reduces the 
specific tax and increases the ad valorem tax in such a way that the first-round effect on tax 
revenue, at the initial equilibrium price, is zero (denoted as a P-shift). Skeath and Trandel 
(1994a) demonstrate that a specific tax can be replaced by a Pareto superior ad valorem tax 
under monopoly that yields higher consumer surplus, profits and tax revenue, and under 
oligopoly if the tax rate is sufficiently high.2 
Assuming identical and constant marginal cost, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider 
(2001) demonstrate that an ad valorem tax will yield higher tax revenue than a specific tax that 
results in the same consumer price. They also consider Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with a 
fixed number of firms and asymmetric costs, and free entry with symmetric costs. Wang and 
Zhao (2009) show that specific taxation can be superior to ad valorem taxation with 
differentiated products and asymmetric costs under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. Recently, 
in a model with endogenous market structure Vetter (2017) shows that a specific tax may be 
superior to an ad valorem tax. In a strategic market game model of oligopoly, Grazzini (2006) 
shows that specific taxation can be superior to ad valorem taxation, but this result is driven by 
                                                 
1 See Keen (1998) for a non-technical introduction to the topic and details of the earlier literature starting 
with Cournot in 1838, Wicksell in 1896 and Suits and Musgrave (1953). 
2 The topic has also been addressed for tariffs in the international trade literature, see Kowalczyk and 
Skeath (1994), Skeath and Trandel (1994b). 
2 
 
the social welfare function. Schröder (2004) shows that ad valorem taxation is superior to 
specific taxation under monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, but Vetter 
(2013) argues that the result is due to the functional form rather than the mode of competition. 
Recently, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) compared the sustainability of collusion 
with ad valorem and specific taxation under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly using the P-shift 
employed by Delipalla and Keen (1992). They consider infinitely-repeated supergames where 
collusion is sustained by either Nash-reversion or optimal punishment strategies, and show that 
a shift from specific to ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain collusion. 
Consequently, in contrast to conventional wisdom, they demonstrate that the specific tax may 
yield higher tax revenue than an ad valorem tax when collusion is sustainable with the ad 
valorem tax but is not sustainable with the specific tax. In this comparison of tax revenue, they 
assume that there is full collusion with the ad valorem tax but no collusion with the specific 
tax. 
In this paper, the sustainability of collusion with ad valorem and specific taxes will be 
reconsidered using a different approach. Rather than using the P-shift, the assumption of 
constant marginal cost will be used as in Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) so that it is 
possible to find a specific tax that results in the same consumer price as an ad valorem tax in 
each phase of the supergame with general demand functions under Cournot oligopoly. In 
contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), it will be shown that the critical discount factor 
required to sustain collusion using Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies 
is the same with an ad valorem tax as with a specific tax that results in the same price. Using 
particular functional forms, linear demand and quadratic costs, it will be shown that it is easier 
to sustain collusion with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same price 
when marginal cost is increasing. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), it 
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is shown that an ad valorem tax always yields higher revenue than a specific tax when the 
possibility of partial collusion is considered. 
2. Cournot Oligopoly 
Consider an infinitely-repeated Cournot oligopoly where firms produce a homogeneous 
product, and the firms have identical and constant marginal cost. There are two or more firms, 
2n  , in the industry. All firms have the same cost function:  i ic q q , where iq  is the 
output of the ith firm and its marginal cost is   0ic q    , which is constant.3 The inverse 
demand function is:  P P Q , where P  is the consumer price and 1n jjQ q  is the total 
output of the firms, and it is assumed to be downward sloping so   0P Q  . Since this is a 
symmetric Cournot oligopoly, the existence of equilibrium is implied by the results of 
McManus (1964, 1962). To ensure the uniqueness (and stability) of the Cournot equilibrium, 
it will be assumed that  1 0n P QP    , see Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987). The government 
imposes either an ad valorem consumption tax:  (expressed as a proportion of the producer 
price), or a specific (per unit) consumption tax: t  at the beginning of the game (stage zero), 
where 0   and 0t  .4 The comparison of the effects of the two forms of taxation will be 
achieved by comparing an ad valorem tax with a specific tax that results in the same price in 
all phases of the game. As in Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) it will turn out that for 
a given ad valorem tax,  , the equivalent specific tax that results in the same price is: t  . 
After the government sets the ad valorem or specific tax, the Cournot oligopoly stage game is 
                                                 
3 The assumption of constant marginal cost is consistent with the assumption of Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2013) that the cost function is convex, and with the assumption of Delipalla and Keen (1992) that 
the Seade (1980) stability condition is satisfied. Constant marginal cost is a fairly standard assumption in oligopoly 
models especially in the analysis of collusion. 
4 This is the standard assumption about the timing of tax setting in the analysis of taxation under 
oligopoly. Note that in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) and Delipalla and Keen (1992) the ad valorem tax is 
expressed as a proportion of the consumer price, but this does not alter the results of the analysis. 
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played an infinite number of times by the firms with profits discounted by the discount factor: 
 , where 0 1  . 
When the other 1n  firms each produce: jq , the profits of the ith firm with an ad 
valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
         
1, 1
, 1
i j
i i j i i
t
i i j i j i i i
P q n q
q q q q
q q P q n q q q tq
  
         (1) 
Following Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001), if the specific tax is set equal to 
t   then the profits of the ith firm with a specific tax are equal to its profits with an ad 
valorem tax multiplied by  1  : 
           1, 1 1 ,1i j iti i j i i i jP q n q qq q q q q               (2) 
Since the firms take the tax rates as exogenous constants, for a given *jq , if *iq  
maximises  *,ti i jq q  then it also maximises  *,i i jq q . This neat result of Anderson, de 
Palma, and Kreider (2001) turns out to be very useful in the analysis of taxation in the infinitely-
repeated game. 
In an infinitely-repeated game, the folk theorem implies that collusion can be sustained 
at the monopoly price if the discount factor is sufficiently high. As in Colombo and Labrecciosa 
(2013), the sustainability of collusion will be analysed for the case of Nash-reversion (grim 
trigger) strategies and for the case of optimal-punishment (stick and carrot) strategies. 
2.1 Nash-Reversion Strategies 
Collusion can be sustained at the monopoly price in this infinitely repeated game by the 
threat of reversion to the Nash equilibrium as in Friedman (1971). The strategy of each firm, 
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in the collusive phase, is to produce the joint profit-maximising output as long as all the other 
firms have done so in all the previous periods. If a firm deviates from the collusive phase then, 
in the deviation phase, it will maximise its profits while all the other firms produce the collusive 
output for one period. Following any deviation, from the next period onwards, in the 
punishment phase, all firms will produce the Cournot-Nash outputs. In the collusive phase, the 
firms maximise joint profits, 1
n
jj   , hence (2) implies that if t   then the joint profit-
maximising output of each firm is the same with both taxes, Mq  and the collusive profits of 
each firm with a specific tax are  1   times collusive profits with an ad valorem tax, 
     1t M Mq q    . In the deviation phase, while the other 1n  firms each produce the 
collusive output Mq , the deviating ith firm maximises profits (1) and, when t  , (2) implies 
that the profit-maximising output when a firm deviates from collusion is the same with both 
taxes, Dq , and the profits of the deviating firm in the deviation phase of the game with a specific 
tax are  1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax      1tD M D Mq q    . In the 
punishment phase, there is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium where all firms maximise profits 
(1) and, when t  , (2) implies that Cournot-equilibrium output will be the same with both 
taxes, Nq , and the profits of each firm in the punishment phase of the game (the Cournot 
equilibrium) with specific tax are  1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax: 
     1t N Nq q    . 
Collusion can be sustained by Nash-reversion strategies if the discounted present value 
of profits in the collusive phase exceeds the discounted present value of profits from deviation 
for one period followed by Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits in the punishment phase: 
      1 ,1 1z z zM D M Nq q q z t          (3) 
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Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor is greater than the critical value defined 
when (3) holds with equality. Hence, the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are: 
        ,z zD M Mz zD M Nq q z tq q        (4) 
When t  , profits with the specific tax are  1   times the profits with the ad 
valorem tax in each phase of the game. Hence, the critical discount factor required to sustain 
collusion is the same with both taxes, t  . This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. In the Cournot oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by Nash-
reversion strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad valorem tax as with a 
specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
If both taxes lead to the same price in the collusive phase then the critical discount 
factor is the same with both taxes.5 The intuition for this result is that although the two taxes 
have different effects on profits, they both have the same effect on the relative profitability of 
collusion, deviation and punishment. Since relative profitability is unaffected by the form of 
taxation, the discount factor is the same with both taxes. This result contrasts with Proposition 1 
of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), where a shift from a specific to an ad valorem tax leads 
to a strict reduction in the critical discount factor. 
In the collusive phase of the game, when t  , since outputs and price with the 
specific tax are the same as outputs and price with the ad valorem tax, it follows that consumer 
surplus and welfare will be the same with both taxes, but tax revenue is higher and profits are 
lower with the ad valorem tax than with the specific tax. 
                                                 
5 Note that if both taxes lead to the same price in the collusive phase then prices with the two taxes will 
be the same in the deviation phase, and prices with the two taxes will be the same in the punishment phase. 
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2.2 Optimal punishments 
Collusion can be sustained at the monopoly price in this infinitely repeated game by the 
use of optimal symmetric punishments as in Abreu (1986), where the punishment lasts for one 
period and then the firms revert to collusion. The strategy of each firm, in the collusive phase, 
is to produce the collusive output provided there has been no deviation in the previous stage. 
Following a deviation, each firm will produce punishment output for one period, the 
punishment phase, and then revert to the collusive phase if all firms went along with the 
punishment. If a firm deviates from the punishment phase, then the punishment phase will 
continue for another period. In the collusive phase, when t   the joint profit-maximising 
output of each firm will be the same with both taxes and is given by Mq . Similarly, the output 
of a firm when it deviates from the collusive phase will be the same with both taxes if t  , 
and is given by Dq . 
In the punishment phase, suppose that each firm produces output Pq , which is assumed 
to be the same with both taxes when t  . Later, it will be verified that this assumption is 
justified. The profits of each firm in the punishment phase with the specific tax are 1   times 
the profits with the ad valorem tax,      1t P Pq q    . If the ith firm deviates from the 
punishment phase, while the other 1n  firms each produce the punishment output Pq , then 
the ith firm maximises profits (1) and, when t  , (2) implies that the profit-maximising 
output is the same with both taxes, DPq . The profits of the firm deviating from the punishment 
phase of the game with the specific tax are  1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax: 
     1tD P D Pq q    . 
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As in Abreu (1986), for the punishment to be credible, the gain from deviating in the 
punishment phase in any period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the next 
period: 
         ,z z z zM P D P Pq q q q z t             (5) 
The optimal punishment output is the largest output that solves (5) when it holds with 
equality. Since profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax 
when t  , any solution for an ad valorem tax is also a solution for a specific tax. Therefore, 
as assumed above, the optimal punishment output is the same with both taxes. 
It is also necessary that the firms find it profitable to continue with the supergame 
following any deviation from the collusive phase. The participation constraint of the firms 
requires that the discounted future profits from collusion must exceed any losses in the 
punishment phase:      1 0z zP Mq q     . Since  0 0c  , a deviating firm can always 
produce zero output and make zero profits so   0zD Pq  , and hence the credibility condition 
(5) implies that the participation constraint holds.6 
For collusion to be sustainable, the gain from deviating in the collusive phase in any 
period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the next period: 
         ,z z z zM P D M Mq q q q z t            (6) 
                                                 
6 The participation constraint may or may not be binding. Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) assume that 
the participation constraint binds in their analysis of optimal punishments. However, with linear demand and 
differentiated products, Lambertini and Sasaki (1999) show that the participation constraint will only bind at the 
critical discount factor in the case of Bertrand duopoly and perfect substitutes. In a homogeneous product Cournot 
duopoly with linear demand and constant marginal cost, the lowest discount factor at which the participation 
constraint binds is 8 9   while collusion at the monopoly price can be sustained for discount factors above the 
critical discount factor: 9 32P  , hence the participation constraint does not bind at the critical discount factor. 
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Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor is greater than the critical value defined 
when (6) holds with equality. Hence, the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are: 
        ,z zD M MP z zM Pq q z tq q        (7) 
When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem 
tax in each phase of the game so the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion is the 
same with both taxes. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. In the Cournot oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by optimal 
symmetric punishment strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad valorem 
tax as with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
The result with optimal punishment strategies is the same as with Nash-reversion 
strategies, and the intuition is also the same.7 The results in Propositons 1 and 2 contrast with 
Propositions 1 and 2 of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), where a shift from a specific to an 
ad valorem tax will lead to a strict reduction in the critical discount factor. The explanation for 
the different results is that their analysis uses the P-shift as in Delipalla and Keen (1992) rather 
than the approach used in Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001). With the P-shift, the 
reduction in the specific tax and the increase in the ad valorem tax are such that the first-round 
effect (holding the price constant) on tax revenue is zero, that is  21 0dt Pd     , which 
implies that the tax changes are proportional to the price in each phase of the infinitely-repeated 
game. Since the prices are different in each phase (collusive, deviation and punishment), the 
necessary tax changes will be different in each phase, and the tax rates in Colombo and 
                                                 
7 It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products, 
see Azacis and Collie (2014). 
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Labrecciosa (2013) should really be conditional on the phase of the game.8 Therefore, using 
the P-shift to analyse taxation in an infinitely-repeated game does not seem to be valid 
approach, and it will not be used in the next section that considers the case of increasing 
marginal cost. 
In the collusive phase of the game, when t  , since outputs and price with the 
specific tax are the same as outputs and price with the ad valorem tax, it follows that the 
equilibrium price, consumer surplus and welfare will be the same with both taxes, but tax 
revenue is higher and profits are lower with the ad valorem tax than with the specific tax. 
 
3. Cournot Duopoly with Linear Demand and Quadratic Costs 
In the previous section, the assumption of constant marginal cost allowed clear-cut 
results to be obtained with general demand functions using the approach of Anderson, de 
Palma, and Kreider (2001). This section will consider the case of increasing marginal cost but, 
as in most of the literature on collusion in infinitely-repeated games, this will require the use 
of particular functional forms so that explicit solutions can be obtained for outputs and profits. 
Also, this section will consider the possibility of partial collusion when full collusion cannot 
be sustained, which was not considered by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013). Since there are 
infinitely many equilibria of the Cournot duopoly supergame, it seems reasonable when 
comparing the two taxes to compare the most profitable equilibria that can be sustained for a 
given discount rate. This is especially true when comparing the tax revenue raised by the two 
taxes. 
                                                 
8 When the taxes are conditional on the phase of the game then the government has to know in advance 
that a firm is going to deviate, and the tax set by the government will signal to the other firms that a firm is going 
to deviate, which would lead all firms to deviate. Therefore, conditional taxes are impossible to implement. 
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Consider an infinitely-repeated Cournot duopoly, 2n  , where firms produce a 
homogeneous product, and the firms have identical quadratic cost functions.9 The ith firm has 
the cost function:   2 2i i ic q q q   , where 0   and 0  , and hence its marginal cost is   0i ic q q     , which is increasing in output if 0   and constant if 0  . The inverse 
demand function is linear:    1 2P Q q q    , where   1 0t       and 0  .10 
It is useful to define the variable 0    , which is the slope of a firm’s marginal cost curve 
relative to the slope of the demand function, and is equal to zero in the case of constant marginal 
cost. Also, to simplify the expressions later in the paper, it is useful to define the following 
terms:   1 0A t       ,  1 0IB I      , where 1,2,...,6I  , 
   21 3 5 2 0D         and    22 3 4 2 0D        . Note that only A is a 
function of the specific tax, t , while 1D  and 2D  do not depend upon either the ad valorem or 
the specific tax. With these demand and cost functions, the profits of the-ith firm when its 
competitor produces output jq , given the ad valorem and specific taxes, are: 
       21 1 2i j i j ii i i i i i iP q q q q qq c q tq q q tq                (8) 
It is straightforward to solve for the joint profit-maximising output and profits of each 
firm as functions of the two taxes: 
    24 4, 2 1M MA Aq qB B       (9) 
                                                 
9 Rothschild (1999) considers collusion in a model with linear demand and quadratic costs, but with 
asymmetric firms, and he does not consider the effects of taxes. Dierickx, Matutes, and Neven (1988) also use 
quadratic cost functions, but they do not analyse collusion. 
10 It is assumed that marginal cost is sufficiently high so that the price is always positive even during the 
punishment phase of the game. 
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The solutions for an ad valorem tax are derived by setting the specific tax equal to zero, 
0t  , and are denoted by a superscript  . Similarly, the solutions for a specific tax are derived 
by setting the ad valorem tax equal to zero, 0  , and are denoted by a superscript t . For 
example, the joint profit-maximising output is    4Mq B        with an ad valorem 
tax and is     4tMq t        with a specific tax. 
3.1 Nash-Reversion Strategies 
When the discount factor is less than the critical value, it is not possible to sustain 
collusion at the joint profit-maximising price, but partial collusion at a lower price may still be 
possible using Nash-reversion strategies. To find the maximum level of collusion that can be 
sustained for a given discount factor, let Cq  be the collusive output. Then, the profits of the 
firms from colluding are: 
     422 1C CC q A B qq      (10) 
If the other firm produces output Cq  then the profit-maximising output and profits for 
a firm that deviates are: 
        22 2, 2 1 CCD C D C A qA qq q qB B        (11) 
Following a deviation by either firm, in the punishment phase, both firms will produce 
the Cournot-Nash output forever thereafter. It is straightforward to show that the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium output and profits are: 
    2 2 23 3, 2 1N NA A Bq qB B       (12) 
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The lowest collusive output that can be sustained using Nash-reversion trigger 
strategies for any given discount factor can be obtained by solving: 
       D C CD C Nq qq q      (13) 
Using (10), (11) and (12) to solve (13) for the collusive output as a function of the 
discount factor yields: 
      23 2 323 3C A B B Bq B B      (14) 
The collusive output is decreasing in the discount factor and is equal to the Cournot-
Nash output when 0  . Full collusion at the joint profit-maximising price can be sustained 
if the discount factor is greater than some critical value, and this critical value can be found by 
solving  C Mq q  , which yields the critical discount factor:   23 617 2 1N B B     . 
Note that with constant marginal cost, 0  , the critical discount factor is: 9 17N  , which 
does not depend upon the tax rates. With increasing marginal cost, setting 0t   yields the 
critical discount factor with an ad valorem tax and setting 0   yields the critical discount 
factor with a specific tax, respectively: 
     223 6 3,17 2 1 17 2 6tN N NB B              (15) 
As shown in Figure 1, the critical discount factor with the specific tax does not depend 
upon the tax rate, and is higher than the critical discount with the ad valorem tax. Therefore, 
there is a range of values for the discount factor, , tN N     , where full collusion can be 
sustained with an ad valorem tax, but cannot be sustained with a specific tax. In this range of 
values for the discount factor, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) 
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higher with a specific tax than that with an ad valorem tax that yields the same price. However, 
they assume that if full collusion is not possible then the result will be the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium even though partial collusion can still be sustained with a specific tax, and 
obviously partial collusion is preferred by the firms. If instead one allows for the possibility of 
partial collusion with a specific tax then for , tN N       there will be full collusion with an 
ad valorem tax but partial collusion with a specific tax. The specific tax can be set so that the 
price will be the same as with the ad valorem tax so  tM Cq q  . Since both taxes lead to the 
same price and output, tax revenue will be higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific 
tax if the difference in revenue per unit,  1N MR P t     , is positive. When 0, N      
there will be partial collusion with both taxes and if the specific tax is set so that    tC Cq q    
then  1N CR P t     . When ,1tN      there will be full collusion with both taxes and 
if the specific tax is set so that tM Mq q   then  1N MR P t     . Allowing for all three 
possibilities, it can be shown that the difference in revenue per unit is: 
 
           
2
3 3 1
4 1
4
1 0 01
1 01
2 1 0 11
N
t
N N N
t
N
E
B B D
F
R
B D
B


                
                    
 (16) 
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The only terms where the sign is not immediately clear are E  and F , but these terms 
can be signed quite easily. Since the term E  is a concave quadratic in the discount factor, which 
is positive when 0   and when N  , it will be positive for 0, N    . Since the term F  
is positive when N   and it is increasing in the discount factor, it will be positive for 
, tN N     . Therefore, an ad valorem tax yields a higher revenue than a specific tax that 
results in the same price in the collusive phase.11 This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. In the Cournot duopoly supergame with linear demand and quadratic costs 
where collusion is supported by Nash-reversion trigger strategies, tax revenue is higher with 
an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
It is known that an ad valorem tax yields higher tax revenue than a specific tax under 
full collusion, when tN  , as this is equivalent to monopoly, and under Cournot oligopoly, 
when 0  . When there is full collusion with an ad valorem tax and partial collusion with a 
specific tax, to keep the collusive price the same with the two taxes the specific tax will have 
to increase (compared to full collusion) thereby increasing tax revenue with the specific tax. 
However, Proposition 3 has shown that this increase in tax revenue is not sufficient to 
overcome the inherent superiority of an ad valorem tax under oligopoly.12 Allowing partial 
collusion when the discount factor is lower than the critical value, a possibility not considered 
by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), restores the conventional wisdom that an ad valorem tax 
yields higher revenue than a specific tax that results in the same price.  
                                                 
11 Some readers may find it paradoxical that an ad valorem tax is superior to a specific tax when there is 
full collusion with the ad valorem tax but only partial collusion with the specific tax. However, both taxes result 
in the same consumer price and hence there is no difference between the two taxes for consumers. Also, partial 
collusion may only be slightly more competitive than full collusion. 
12 Given that there are these two opposing effects, it is difficult to generalise Proposition 3 although one 
may suspect that it is a fairly general result. 
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3.2 Optimal Punishment Strategies 
Partial collusion can also be sustained using optimal symmetric punishment strategies 
as in Abreu (1986). The profits in the collusive phase when each firm produces output Cq  are 
given by (10), and the profits if a firm deviates from the collusive phase are given by (11). 
Similarly, in the punishment phase, the profits when each firm produces output Pq  are: 
     422 1P PP q A B qq     (17) 
The output and profits when a firm deviates from the punishment phase and the other 
firm produces the collusive output Pq  are: 
        22 2, 2 1 PPD P D P A qA qq q qB B       (18) 
With partial collusion, the outputs in the collusive and the punishment phases are 
obtained by solving the credibility and sustainability conditions for a given discount factor, as 
in Abreu (1986): 
 
              D P P C PD C C C Pq q q qq q q q                  (19) 
Solving for the outputs in the collusive and punishment phases as functions of the 
discount factor, and ignoring the trivial solution where both the outputs are equal to the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs, C P Nq q q  , yields: 
        2 23 2 3 23 3
3 3
4 , 4C PA Aq B B q B BB B         (20) 
Both outputs are linear in the discount factor with the collusive output decreasing in   
and the punishment output increasing in  , and both are equal to the Cournot-Nash output 
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when 0  . Full collusion at the joint profit-maximising price can be sustained if the discount 
factor is greater than some critical value, and this critical value can be obtained by solving  C Mq q  , which yields the critical discount factor:  23 2 44P B B B  . Note that with 
constant marginal cost, 0  , the critical discount factor is: 9 32P  , which does not depend 
upon the tax rates. With increasing marginal cost, setting 0t   yields the critical discount factor 
with an ad valorem tax and setting 0   yields the critical discount factor with a specific tax, 
respectively: 
    2232 4 3,4 4 2 4tP P PBB B         (21) 
As shown in Figure 2, the critical discount factor with the specific tax does not depend 
upon the tax rate, whereas the critical discount with the ad valorem tax is decreasing in the tax 
rate, 0P    , and they are equal when there are no taxes, 0t   . Therefore, there is a 
range of values for the discount factor, , tP P     , where full collusion can be sustained with 
an ad valorem tax, but cannot be sustained with a specific tax. However, partial collusion can 
be sustained with a specific tax. 
As in the case of Nash-reversion strategies, the specific tax can be set so that the price 
in the collusive phase is the same as with the ad valorem tax. Since both taxes lead to the same 
output, and again allowing for all three possibilities, the difference in revenue per unit with the 
ad valorem and specific tax can be shown to be: 
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The only terms where the sign is not immediately clear are G  and H , but these terms 
can be signed quite easily. Since the term G  is a concave quadratic, which is positive when 
0   and when P  , it will be positive for 0, P    . Since the term H  is positive when 
P
   and it is increasing in  , it will be positive for , tP P     . Therefore, an ad valorem 
tax yields a higher revenue than a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive 
phase. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. In the Cournot duopoly supergame with linear demand and quadratic costs 
where collusion is supported by optimal-punishment strategies, tax revenue is higher with an 
ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
Again, allowing partial collusion when the discount factor is lower than the critical 
value, restores the conventional wisdom that an ad valorem tax yields higher revenue than a 
specific tax that results in the same price, in contrast to Proposition 3 of Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2013). 
With this linear demand function (and quadratic costs), the critical discount factor for 
full collusion was higher with a specific tax than with an ad valorem tax for the case of Nash-
reversion punishments and for the case of optimal punishments, which is in line with the results 
of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) that it is easier to sustain collusion with an ad valorem tax 
than with a specific tax. A counterexample can be used to show that this is not a general result. 
If the inverse demand function is changed to be:   21 2P q q    , and the cost function 
is the same as above then the model can be solved explicitly for the case of Nash-reversion 
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punishments using the same steps as in Section 3.1.13 Figure 3 shows the critical discount 
factors as a function of the ad valorem tax rate, and it can be seen that the critical discount 
factor is higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. In this counter-example, it is 
easier to sustain collusion with a specific tax than with an ad valorem tax. However, it will still 
be the case that tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. 
When the discount factor is such that full collusion is sustainable with a specific tax but only 
partial collusion is sustainable with an ad valorem tax, the specific tax would have to be 
reduced (compared to under full collusion) to keep the collusive price the same with the two 
taxes, which would reduce tax revenue with the specific tax, which would strengthen the 
superiority of the ad valorem tax. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis has compared the effects of ad valorem and specific taxes that result in 
the same price on the sustainability of collusion in infinitely repeated oligopoly models. 
Assuming constant marginal cost, it was shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem 
taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result 
was shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products and general demand 
functions. It can also be shown for Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products and general 
demand functions when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-
punishment strategies. The intuition for these results is that, although both taxes have different 
effects on profits, they have the same effect on relative profits because profits with an ad 
valorem tax are always proportional to profits with a specific tax. These results contrast with 
those of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) who use the P-shift of Delipalla and Keen (1992) in 
their analysis. 
                                                 
13 This demand function is a special case of the demand function used by Lambertini (1996) to analyse 
collusion, which was first suggested in a different context by Anderson and Engers (1992). 
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Also, in a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it was shown 
that the critical discount factor was lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax when 
marginal cost was increasing. In this case, there is a range of values for the discount factor 
where full collusion is possible with an ad valorem tax, but is not possible with a specific tax. 
In this region, in contrast to conventional wisdom, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) show that 
revenue may be higher with a specific tax than with an ad valorem tax, but they assume that 
the outcome will be Nash (Cournot or Bertrand) equilibrium if the discount factor is lower than 
the critical value. However, partial collusion is still possible when the discount factor is lower 
than the critical value. Allowing for the possibility of partial collusion, it was shown that 
revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. Therefore, 
conventional wisdom still holds if the possibility of partial collusion is allowed in the 
comparison of the tax revenue from the two taxes. 
Finally, a counterexample to the result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) shows that 
it is possible that collusion is easier with a specific tax than with an ad valorem tax. This 
counterexample demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining general results in infinitely-repeated 
games. 
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